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Abstract
We build and calibrate a New Keynesian monetary business cycle model to the
Indian economy to understand why the aggregate demand channel of monetary trans-
mission is weak. Our main nding is that base money shocks have a larger and more
persistent e¤ect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. We show that
nancial repression, in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest
rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. This is contrary to the consensus view
in policy discussions on Indian monetary policy. We show that the presence of an
informal sector hinders monetary transmission.
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1 Introduction
With the formal adoption of ination targeting by the Reserve Bank of India, monetary
policy in India has undergone a major overhaul. With clearly dened objectives, clear
operating procedures, and a nominal anchor that the public understands, the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy has become much more transparent. India is now a exible
ination targeter, where a newly convened monetary policy committee (as of September
2016) is tasked to maintain a medium term CPI-headline ination at 4%, within a oor of
2% and a ceiling of 6%.
Despite major changes in monetary policy however, monetary transmission has found
to be partial, asymmetric and slow (Das (2015); Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016); and
Mohanty and Rishab (2016)). Decomposing monetary transmission through the bank lending
channel in two steps - from policy rates to bank lending rates - and then from lending rates to
aggregate demand, Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016) nd that not only is pass through
from the policy rate to the bank lending rates incomplete, but there is little empirical support
for any e¤ect of monetary policy shocks on aggregate demand.1 Consistent with this, the
"Report of the Expert Committee to Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework" (2014)2,
also known as the Urjit Patel Committee Report, highlights several structural factors that
hinder monetary transmission in India, such as the role of nancial repression in the form of
SLR3, small savings schemes (with administered interest rates), and the presence of a large
informal sector to name a few. The Urjit Patel Committee Report (2014) also notes that
"... the conduct of liquidity management (is) often mutually inconsistent and conicting.
Often, increases in the policy rate have been followed up with discretionary measures to ease
liquidity conditions (page 36)". Shocks to autonomous drivers of liquidity, such as currency
demand, bank reserves (required plus excess), government deposits with the Reserve Bank
of India, and net foreign market operations, complicate the alignment of the policy repo
rate - the short term signalling rate - with the overnight weighted average call rate (WACR)
under the liquidity adjustment facility.4
1Both Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016) and Mohanty and Rishab (2016) provide recent surveys of
monetary transmission in India and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) respectively.
2https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=30446
3The SLR, or the statutory liquidity ratio, provides a captive market for government securities and helps
to articially suppress the cost of borrowing for the Government, dampening the transmission of interest
rate changes across the term structure. See the Urjit Patel Committee Report (2014).
4Since 2001, the Reserve Bank of India has conducted monetary policy through a corridor system called
the LAF (liquidity adjustment facility). The LAF essentially allows banks to undertake collateralized
lending and borrowing to meet short term asset-liability mismatches. The Repo rate is the rate at which
banks borrow money from the RBI by selling short term government securities to the RBI, and then "re-
purchases" them back. A reverse repo operation takes place when the RBI borrows money from banks by
lending securities. See Mishra, Montiel and Sengupta (2016, pages 73-74).
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This paper develops a New Keynesian monetary business cycle model of the Indian econ-
omy to understand why the aggregate demand channel of monetary transmission is weak.
The aggregate demand channel is important because consumption and investment constitute
roughly 87% of Indian GDP.
Our goal is four-fold. First, while there are a large number of empirical papers and policy
reports that study the strength of monetary transmission channels in the Indian context,
there are very few studies on monetary transmission in India using a DSGE framework.5
Our paper lls this gap. Second, as will be shown in Section 2, from an impulse response
function exercise generated from an atheoretical VAR, we show that if we dene monetary
policy as a change in the monetary base, monetary transmission does not appear to be that
weak. In contrast, the condence band of output with respect to a policy rate shock is
either not robust, or weaker than the money base shock in generating a persistent e¤ect
on output. We highlight this as a key stylized fact in the model that not only disciplines
our calibration exercise, but requires a theoretical understanding of how base money shocks
get transmitted to the rest of the economy. As we will show later, base money shocks are
inationary and lead to a positive expansion in economic output. However, a fall in the policy
rate has a weak e¤ect on the economy. Third, motivated by the role of nancial repression in
hindering monetary transmission, our model embeds nancial repression in monetary policy
making in India by incorporating two key features endemic to the Indian nancial sector (i)
SLR requirements for banks, and (ii) administered interest rate setting by the government.
Allowing for such frictions provides a more realistic description of banking intermediation in
the transmission of monetary impulses in the Indian context. And fourth, in an extended
version of the model, we di¤erentiate between a "banked" population, that intermediates
through the formal banking system, and an "unbanked" population, that uses cash as a
medium of transaction. Our rationale for adding an unbanked population is to proxy for a
large informal sector in India, and study how this a¤ects transmission of monetary policy.
1.1 Description of the model
Our core model is a monetary RBC model with sticky prices and a banking sector. The
economy is populated by households and wholesale entrepreneurs, each group having unit
mass. Households consume, work, and accumulate savings in risk-free bank deposits as well
as postal deposits with a xed government set interest rate. We assume that households own
the banks. On the production side, wholesale entrepreneurs produce homogenous interme-
diate goods using capital, bought from capital goods producers, loans obtained from banks,
5See Gabriel et al. (2012) for an early attempt. Banerjee and Basu (2017) develop a small open economy
DSGE model for India but do not study the monetary transmission mechanism.
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and hired labor from households. Similar to other papers in this literature (see Gerali et
al. (2010)), capital goods producers are introduced to derive a market price for capital. A
monopolistically competitive retail sector buys intermediate goods from wholesale entrepre-
neurs, and produces a single nal good. Retail prices are sticky and indexed to steady state
ination: This allows monetary policy to have real e¤ects. Retailers also face a quadratic
price adjustment cost a la Rotemberg.
Banks in the current set-up are assumed to be perfectly competitive.6 Banks maximize
cash ows in every period, o¤er savings deposits to households and loans to wholesale entre-
preneurs, subject to the constraints that a xed fraction of deposits in every period are set
aside for (i) a statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) and (ii) the reserve requirement. We
allow for the stochastic withdrawal of deposits in each period as in Chang et al. (2014). At
date t; if the withdrawal exceeds bank reserves (cash in vault), banks fall back on the Central
Bank for emergency loans at a penalty rate mandated by the central bank: The presence of
SLR requirements and administered interest rates capture the essence of nancial repression
in the Indian economy.
We assume that the central bank is a exible ination targeter, as in India. In the baseline,
there is no currency in the model, and so the supply of reserves equals the monetary base.
The central bank lets the monetary base, or the supply of reserves increase by a simple rule
that is perturbed in every period by base-money shocks, or autonomous liquidity shocks. In
addition to these shocks, the economy is also hit in every period by total factor productivity
shocks, scal policy shocks, investment specic technology (IST) shocks, and interest rate
shocks. To deal with the inationary consequences of autonomous liquidity shocks, the
central bank has one instrument at its disposal: the short term interest rate on government
bonds, which we interpret as the policy rate, and which is governed by a conventional Taylor
rule. The economy is hit periodically with autonomous liquidity, or base money shocks,
which are inationary, and therefore warrant a monetary policy response using the Taylor
rule.7 On the scal side, the government spending is stochastic. The government issues
public debt held by banks to cover the di¤erence between government spending and lump
sum taxes. Administered postal deposits, which attract a government set interest rate in the
Indian economy, are directly assumed to augment government revenues in every period.
In an extended version of the model, we introduce currency as a medium of transaction.
We retain the wholesale entrepreneur of the baseline model, but assume that risk neutral
forward looking entrepreneurs hire from two groups of workers: forward looking households
6Market power in the banking industry in Gerali et al. (2010) is modelled using a Dixit-Stiglitz framework
for retail and credit deposit markets.
7The transmission from the Repo rate to short maturity T-Bills (up to 2 years) is immediate in India.
Hence, we will interpret the short term T-bill rate as the policy rate in the rest of the paper.
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who supply labor as a credit good (Ricardian consumers), and households who supply labor
as a cash good (Rule of thumb consumers). The rule of thumb consumers do not make
deposits in banks, and are therefore "unbanked", and have to be paid in cash. The standard
inter-temporal substitution e¤ect does not apply for unbanked households. Entrepreneurs
however face a cash in advance constraint. Because of the payment friction, the wages across
both groups will not be the same. In the steady state, we show that higher ination will
depress the rule of thumb consumers wage, and create more wage inequality. Overall, there
are two novelties to this extension: (i) it provides a natural justication for the transaction
demand for money and (ii) it gives rise to the distributional e¤ects of monetary policy, which
in turn a¤ects monetary transmission. Because an inationary monetary policy depresses the
real wage of the rule of thumb consumers, their consumption falls. Monetary transmission
therefore worsens through the aggregate demand channel.
In the calibration exercise, we rst specify the baseline parameterization of the model.
We then calibrate the shock structure to match empirical moments, report the variance de-
composition results for the baseline model and the extended model, and undertake sensitivity
experiments on the di¤erent structural and policy factors a¤ecting monetary transmission.
We also explain the impulse response properties of the baseline and extended model.
1.2 Main results
Our calibrated baseline model allows us to highlight nine main results. First, we identify the
propagation mechanism of autonomous liquidity shocks, or autonomous base money shocks,
to the rest of the economy. We show that an expansionary base money shock stimulates con-
sumption, investment, hours worked, capital accumulation, and opens up a positive output
gap on impact. An increase in base money is also inationary. The rise in ination and the
output gap leads to a rise in the policy rate via the Taylor rule, which targets the short term
interest rate on government bonds. On the other hand, a fall in the government bond rate,
via the Taylor rule, also has similar expansionary e¤ects on the economy, but the e¤ects are
rather weak.
Second, our baseline model shows that about half of the uctuation (variance) in output
are explained by TFP shocks and approximately 30% is explained by scal shocks. Monetary
policy in terms of interest rate shocks and base money shocks explain a small fraction of
output variation comparatively - approximately 17%. Within this, monetary base accounts
for 13.8%. Ination (71.76%) and the bank lending rate (63.48%) are also largely driven by
shocks to total factor productivity.
Third, a similar pattern of variance decomposition is observed in the extended model.
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The relative importance of money shocks (money base and policy rate) however declines to
approximately 14%, with the loss picked up by the scal shock. The presence of an unbanked
channel "clogs" the regular pass-through of monetary transmission to aggregate demand.
The existence of rule of thumb consumers amplies the scal spending shock contribution
to output uctuations. Overall though, as in the baseline model, the horse race on shocks is
preserved. Also, we uncover why transmission weakens when we add an informal sector to
the model. Because the standard inter-temporal substitution of consumption e¤ect does not
apply to the unbanked population, an inationary monetary policy shock - which a¤ects their
real wages - lowers their real wage when ination rises. The unbanked population is unable
to use to the real interest rate to smooth their consumption. Under the parameterization
used in the model, because their consumption is equal to the real wage, their consumption
demand falls with an inationary base money shock one-for-one.
Fourth, our sensitivity experiments with respect to structural and policy parameters
indicate that the households preference for commercial bank deposits vs deposits with ad-
ministered interest rates have small e¤ects on monetary transmission as measured by the
forecast error variance of output due to autonomous monetary shocks. More importantly, the
statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, the nancial repression parameters,
have small e¤ects on monetary transmission. This observation goes against the consensus
view on nancial repression and monetary transmission in India. This shows that nancial
repression, either in the form of administered interest rates or SLR cause weak monetary
transmission in the economy as is widely believed.
Fifth, and not surprisingly, with low price adjustment costs (p) and a higher degree of
past ination indexation (p) in the retail sector, monetary transmission becomes weaker.
Lower values of the nominal friction and the lack of forward looking price setting behavior
limits the real e¤ects of a monetary policy shock via the expectation channel.
Sixth, the mark-down factor () for the deposit interest rate has a major implication
for monetary transmission driven by the money base. The transmission of monetary base
shock becomes conspicuously higher as seen by the error variance decomposition and money-
output correlation while the transmission of interest rate shock is remarkably diminished.
The intuition for this stems from the fact that a lower  marks down the interest rate
on deposit which discourages the household to accumulate bank deposits. Since reserve
demand is proportional to bank deposits (see eq 27), banks hold fewer reserves and extend
more loans. Thus the propagation of a shock to monetary base becomes stronger through the
bank lending channel because banks hold less reserves. On the other hand, as iLt is largely
determined by ination, a lower  widens the spread between borrowing and lending rates,
(iLt   iDt ), and the policy rate accounts for less variation in output.
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Seventh, less aggressive ination targeting (lower ') and less output stabilization (lower
'y) raises the pass through of monetary base shock to output, ination and the nominal loan
rate.
Eighth, a comparison of output impulse responses of monetary base versus policy rate
shocks reveals that the output response is much more prolonged for a positive shock to
the monetary base as opposed to a negative shock to the interest rate. The impact e¤ect of
output with respect to a monetary base shock is signicantly bigger than the output response
with respect to a negative policy rate shock. In addition, the positive e¤ect lasts more than
20 quarters for a monetary base shock, while for the interest rate shock it dissipates after 10
quarters. The punch-line of this exercise is that a shock to monetary base has a far stronger
and persistent e¤ect on output than the shock to policy interest rate. This agrees well with
the empirical VAR impulse responses reported in Section 2.
Ninth, the smoothing coe¢ cient of the policy rate Taylor rule has a noteworthy impli-
cation for monetary transmission. A higher smoothing coe¢ cient signicantly enhances the
monetary transmission of the policy rate as evidenced by the variance decomposition of out-
put. The policy rate accounts for 15.25% as opposed to 3.73% of output variation when the
smoothing coe¢ cient rises. The greater response of output is due to more persistent varia-
tion in the interest rate in response to a policy shock which translates into more persistent
output uctuations.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we present a set of impulse response plots of output and ination with respect
to the shocks to monetary policy instruments namely, monetary base and the policy interest
rate. We deploy an atheoretical Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework with four variables:
growth rate of money reserves, 91 day treasury bill rate, de-trended real GDP and ination
measured as year-on-year change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).8 We consider two types
of impulse response functions. The rst is based on a Cholesky ordering. The second is the
generalized impulses approach suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998). The Cholesky ordering
is extensively used in the literature to examine the e¤ects of a monetary shock on various
macroeconomic variables (Iacoviello, 2005). However, this identication scheme is sensitive
8In Appendix E, we have provided the details on the data sources and the transformations used of the
relevant macroeconomic variables for our analysis. In the VAR model, we have incorporated two time dummy
variables, one is for money growth rate and the other is for the treasury bill rate. We also include government
spending to control for its inuence on movements in the short-term government bond interest rate. Using
information criteria, we have chosen lags of four quarters for the analysis. The AR roots of the VAR model
specication satises the stability condition.
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to the ordering of variables. For robustness therefore, we use the generalized impulses for
identication, which is independent of ordering. The impulse response plots are displayed in
Figure 1 and 2. The shaded areas show the statistically signicant periods in the reaction
of output to policy shocks. The e¤ects of a policy shock on CPI ination is found to be
statistically insignicant in all the cases.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses under Cholesky-type Identication
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses under Pesaran-type Identication
The main nding is that the interest rate policy shock has a weaker e¤ect on GDP
than the monetary base shock. This is validated by both the Cholesky and Pesaran type
identication schemes. Under the Cholesky type identication, responses of output to base
money growth shocks and interest rate shocks are statistically signicant for ve and three
quarters, respectively. Over a one year horizon, the accumulated e¤ect on output of a money
growth shock is thirty two per cent higher than that of the interest rate shock. In case of
the generalized Pesaran type identication, the response of output to the interest rate shock
turns out to be statistically insignicant although it remains statistically signicant for the
money growth shock.9
To summarize, the empirically observed impulse response functions (IRF) reveal that
monetary policy transmission is weak in India if we look at it from the perspective of trans-
mission via the policy rate. However, if we dene monetary policy as a change in the mon-
etary base, the monetary transmission does not appear to be that weak. Money base has a
signicant e¤ect on output as evidenced by the statistically signicant condence bands of
its IRFs for output. In contrast, the condence band of output with respect to policy rate
shocks is either not robust or weaker than the money base shock to generate a persistent
e¤ect on output. These results conrm previous ndings in the literature highlighted in the
introduction, and set the motivation for us to develop a monetary business cycle model for
the Indian economy to understand monetary transmission.
3 The Model
3.1 Household
The economy is populated by innitely lived households of unit mass. The representative
household maximizes expected utility.
max
Ct;Ht;Dt;Dat
Et
1X
s=0
s[U(Ct+s)  (Ht+s) + V (Dt+s=Pt+s; Dat+s=Pt+s)] (1)
which depends on hours worked, Ht; consumption of the nal good, Ct; and saving in the
form of risk-free bank and postal deposits, Dt; and Dat respectively. Household choices must
9E¤ect of the interest rate shock on output is insignicant since the condence band of the IRF includes
both positive and negative quadrants.
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obey the following budget constraint (in nominal terms)
Pt (Ct + Tt) +Dt +D
a
t  WtHt + (1 + iDt )Dt 1 + (1 + ia)Dat 1 +kt +rt +bt (2)
The left hand side of equation (2) represents the ow of expenses which includes current
consumption (where Pt is the aggregate price index and Tt > 0 denote lump-sum taxes),
nominal bank deposits, Dt and postal deposits, Dat : Resources consist of wage earnings,
WtHt; where Wt is the wage rate, payments on deposits made in the previous period, t  1;
where iDt > 0 is the rate on one-period deposits (or savings contracts) in the banking system,
and ia > 0 is the xed government administered interest rate on postal deposits made by
households. kt is the rebate given back to households from capital goods rms. 
r
t denote
nominal prots rebated back from the retail goods sector, and bt are rebates given back to
households from banks.10 As in Gali (2008), all prots are net of taxes and transfers.
Using Dt=Pt = dt and Dat =Pt = d
a
t , and substituting out for U
0(Ct) = tPt; we can
re-write the households optimality conditions as:
Dt : U
0(Ct) = V 01(dt; d
a
t ) + Et

U 0(Ct+1)(1 + iDt+1)(Pt=Pt+1)
	
; (3)
Dpt : U
0(Ct) = V 02(dt; d
a
t ) + Et fU 0(Ct+1)(1 + ia)(Pt=Pt+1)g (4)
0(Ht) = (Wt=Pt)U 0(Ct): (5)
Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation for bank deposits. Equation (4) is the Euler
equation for postal deposits which attract the administered interest rate, ia: Equation (5) is
the standard intra-temporal optimality condition for labor supply.
3.2 Capital good producing rms
Our description of the capital goods producing rms is standard. Perfectly competitive rms
buy last periods undepreciated capital, (1   k)Kt 1; at (real) price Qt from wholesale-
entrepreneurs (who own the rms) and It units of the nal good from retailers at price Pt:
The transformation of the nal good into new capital is subject to adjustment costs; St:11
Capital goods producing rms maximize
10Please refer to Appendix A for all derivations.
11We assume that
S

It
It 1

= (=2)

It
It 1
  1
2
:
10
max
It
Et
1X
j=0

t;t+jPt+j

Qt+jIt+j  

1 + S

It+j
It+j 1

It+j

(6)
s.t. Kt = (1  k)Kt 1 + Zx;tIt (7)
where 
t;t+j is the stochastic discount factor and Zx;t is an investment specic technology
(IST) shock that follows an AR(1) process:
lnZxt   ln
 
Zx = zx

lnZxt 1   ln
 
Zzx

+ zxt
where zxt is an i.i.d shock.
The rst order condition is
@ (:)
@It
= 
t;tPtQt 
t;tPt

1 + S

It
It 1

 
t;tPtS 0

It
It 1

It
It 1
+
t;t+1Pt+1S
0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
= 0:
(8)
which yields the capital good pricing equation,
Qt = 1 + S

It
It 1

+ S 0

It
It 1

It
It 1
  EtU
0 (Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)
"
S 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2#
: (9)
3.3 Wholesale good producing rms
Wholesale, or intermediate goods rms are run by risk neutral entrepreneurs who produce
intermediate goods for the nal good producing retailers in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment. The entrepreneurs hire labor from households and purchase new capital from the
capital good producing rms. They borrow an amount Lt > 0 of loans from the bank in
order to meet the value of new capital, QtKt; where Kt is the capital stock. We assume that
all capital spending is debt nanced. Used capital at date t+ 1 is sold at the resale market
at the price Qt+1: The balance sheet condition of a representative wholesale rm is:
QtKt =

Lt
Pt

: (10)
In the steady state Qt = 1 which means lt = LtPt = Kt; i.e., all capital is intermediated. The
production function for a representative wholesale goods producer is given by
11
Y Wt = AtK

t 1H
1 
t (11)
with 0 <  < 1: At denotes stochastic total factor productivity, and follows anAR(1)process:
lnAt   ln
 
A = a

lnAt 1   ln
 
A

+ At
where At is an i.i.d shock.
The (real) wage rate, Wt
Pt
; is given by
Wt=Pt = (P
W
t =Pt)| {z }
Real Price of Wholesale Output
MPHt = (1  ) (P
W
t =Pt)Y
W
t
Ht
; (12)
where PWt =Pt is the real price of wholesale output. This allows us to obtain the rate of
return from capital,1 + rkt+1; as
1 + rkt+1 =
(PWt+1=Pt+1)Y
W
t+1   (Wt+1=Pt+1)Ht+1 + (1  k)KtQt+1
QtKt
=
(PWt+1=Pt+1)

YWt+1
Kt

  (1  ) (PWt+1=Pt+1)YWt+1
Ht+1

Ht+1
Kt

+ (1  k)Qt+1
Qt
=
(PWt+1=Pt+1)MPKt+1 + (1  k)Qt+1
Qt
The optimality condition for a rmsdemand for capital is given by the following arbitrage
condition,
1 + rkt+1 =
 
1 + iLt+1
 Pt
Pt+1
: (13)
This yields,
(1 + iLt+1) =
PWt+1MPKt+1 + (1  k)Pt+1Qt+1
PtQt
1 + iLt+1 =

Pwt+1
Pt+1

MPKt+1
Qt+1
+ 1  k
 
Pt+1Qt+1
PtQt

: (14)
3.4 Final good retail rms
Retailers buy intermediate goods at price PWt and package them into nal goods and operate
in a monopolistically competitive environment as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
They convert the ith variety of the intermediate good, yWt (i) ; into yt (i) one-to-one and
di¤erentiate goods at zero cost. Each retailer sells his unique variety of nal product after
applying a markup over the wholesale price, and factoring in the market demand condition
12
which is characterized by price elasticities
 
"Y

: Retailers prices are sticky and indexed to
past and steady state ination as in Gerali et al. (2010): If retailers want to change their
price over and above what indexation allows, they have to bear a quadratic adjustment cost
given by p:
Retailers choose fPt+j (i)g1j=0 to maximize present value of their expected prot.
max
Pt(i)
Et
1X
s=0

t;t+s

rt+sjt
	
(15)
subject to the demand constraint, yt+jjt (i) =

Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
 "Y
yt+j; where the prot function of
the ith retailer is given by,
rt (i) = Pt (i) yt (i)  PWt (i) yWt (i) 
p
2
"
Pt+j (i)
Pt+j 1 (i)
  (1 + t 1)p(1 +  )1 p
2
Ptyt
#
;
(16)
p > 0, 0 < p < 1; and
yt =
Z 1
0
yt (i)
"Y  1
"Y di
 "Y
"Y  1
where "Y > 1:
Note that p is an indexation parameter. This price adjustment cost specication is borrowed
from Gerali et al. (2010). The rst order condition after imposing a symmetric equilibrium
is standard:
1  "Y + "Y ( Pt
PWt
) 1   p
n
1 + t   (1 + t 1)p(1 +  )1 p
o
= 0: (17)
From equation (17), a rise in t leads to a rise in
PWt
Pt
or real marginal costs (since "Y > 1
). Hence, real marginal costs and ination co-move in the same direction. As we will show
later, a positive base money shock, by increasing ination, increases P
W
t
Pt
: This raises the
value of the marginal product of labor (VMPL) and the value of the marginal product of
capital (VMPK); making the demand for labor and capital increase, leading to an output
expansion.
In the steady state, when t+1 = t = ; the steady state mark-up is,
P
PW
=
"Y
"Y   1 : (18)
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3.5 Banks
The representative bank maximizes cash ows by o¤ering savings contracts (deposits) and
borrowing contracts (loans). The banking sector is assumed to be competitive. Banks are
also mandated to keep reserves with the central bank. In India, and many other emerging
market economies (EMEs), banks are also constrained to buy government debt from deposit
inows as mandated by a statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). In every period, following Chang
et al.(2014), we assume that banks face a stochastic withdrawal of deposits at the end of
each period, t. At date t; if the withdrawal (say ]Wt 1) exceeds bank reserve (cash in vault),
banks fall back on the Central Bank for emergency loans at a penalty rate ip mandated by
the Central Bank (CB): Banks pay back the emergency borrowing to the CB at the end
of the period. This withdrawal uncertainty necessitates a demand for excess reserve by the
banks.
Dene iLt to be the interest rate on loans, Lt 1, i
R to be the interest rate on reserves,MRt ;
mandated by the central bank, and fWt is the stochastic withdrawal. Dt denotes deposits.
We assume that bank has a SLR equal to q 2 [0; 1]:
The banks cash ow at date t can be rewritten as:
bt = (1 + i
L
t )Lt 1 + (1 + i
R)MRt 1 + q(1 + i
G
t )Dt 1| {z }
SLR on last periods deposits
  (1 + iDt )Dt 1| {z }
Cost of Funds of Last periods Deposits
(19)
  (1 + ip)t(]Wt 1  MRt 1; 0)  (1  t)]Wt 1 + Dt|{z}
Current Deposits
  qDt| {z }
SLR this period
  Lt  MRt
where t is an indicator function which is unity if fWt 1 MRt 1 > 0 and zero otherwise. The
timing of decisions is crucial in our setting to make the banks problem meaningful.12 At
date t, banks make decisions about loans (Lt) and reserve (MRt ) after observing the deposit
(Dt). On the other hand, depositors could partially withdraw their deposit randomly.13 This
12The withdrawal of deposits happens at the end of the period. If the withdrawal exceeds reserve by x
rupees at the end of the day, the Central Bank charges a y percent penalty rate. Thus the banks penalty is
x(1+y) rupees which includes the principal and the penalty interes .which the bank has to pay at the end of
the period or the start of the next period. On the other hand if the withdrawal x is less than existing reserve,
the bank does not incur any penalty but it still loses x from its cash ow. Taking this into consideration,
the bank chooses its reserve holding optimally at the start of date t.
13We do not model here the withdraw decision of households and assume that the withdrawal, fWt is
random i.i.d process and it cannot exceed deposits. This basically rules out a sudden stop with a full bank
run. This random withdrawal makes the cash ow of the bank risky. This cash ow is ploughed back as a
transfer (TRt) to the household.
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basically gives a motivation to banks to hold excess reserve as in Chang et al. (2013). The
rst two terms on the right hand side correspond to the interest earned in time t on loans
disbursed in time t   1, and interest on reserves in the previous period, MRt 1: Since the
bank is forced to hold government debt as a constant fraction, q; of incoming deposits,
q(1 + i
G
t )Dt 1, denotes the interest earnings on SLR debt holdings by banks. As described
above, banks also face a penalty, at a constant penal rate, ip > 0; for stochastic withdrawals
over and above their bank reserves. The penalty amount is (1+ip)(]Wt 1 MRt 1). We assume
that banks o¤er a deposit rate, iDt ; which is a mark-down of the interest rate that it receives
on government bonds, iGt . In other words, 1 + i
D
t = (1 + i
G
t ) where 0 <  < 1. We do not
model the mark-down, , but calibrate it. Rewrite the cash ow in equation (19) as
bt = (1 + i
L
t )Lt 1 + (1 + i
R)MRt 1   (   q)(1 + iGt )Dt 1 (20)
  (1 + ip)t(]Wt 1  MRt 1; 0)  (1  t)]Wt 1
+ (1  q)Dt   Lt  MRt
The representative bank maximizes discounted cash ows in two stages. It rst solves for its
optimal demand for reserves, MRt : Next, it chooses the loan amount, Lt. Specically, banks
maximize
Max
MRt ; Lt
Et
1X
s=0

bt;t+s
b
t+s
subject to the statutory reserve requirement:
MRt = rDt (21)
where 
t;t+s =
sU 0(ct+s)
U 0(ct) :
Pt
Pt+s
is the ination adjusted stochastic discount factor.
The Euler equation is given by14
Et
t;t+1
"
(1 + iR) + (1 + ip)
Z Dt
MRt
f(fWt)dfWt#+ t = 1 (22)
The rst term in the square bracket in equation (22) is the banks interest income from
reserves. The second term is the expected saving of penalty because of holding more reserves
t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the reserve constraint (21). The Kuhn Tucker
condition states that
MRt
Dt
= r if t > 0:
14See Technical Appendix A.
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Assume that the reserve requirement is not binding, which implies that t = 0 (i.e., banks
hold excess reserves): Assuming a rectangular distribution for fWt over [0; Dt]15, (22) reduces
to:
MRt : 1 = Et
t;t+1

(1 + iR) + (1 + ip)(1  M
R
t
Dt
)

: (23)
We solve M
R
t
Dt
as follows:
MRt
Dt
= 1  1  (1 + i
R)Et
t;t+1
(1 + ip)Et
t;t+1
; (24)
which is the same as writing
xt
dt
= 1  1  (1 + i
R)Et
t;t+1
(1 + ip)Et
t;t+1
(25)
where xt = MRt =Pt and dt = Dt=Pt. It is straightforward to verify that given the stochastic
discount factor, 
t;t+1; a higher iR or ip means a higher MRt as expected.
Once the banks reserve demand problem is solved, we next turn to optimal loan dis-
bursement. Note that the bank solves a recursive problem of choosing Lt+s given Lt+s 1
which was chosen in the previous period. This is a dynamic allocation problem. The rst
order condition with respect to Lt is given by,

t;t( 1) + Et
t;t+1(1 + iLt+1) = 0:
This gives the loan Euler equation:
Lt : 1 = Et
t;t+1(1 + i
L
t+1) (26)
Substituting out for Et
t;t+1 in equation (26) and putting it into equation (24), we see the
following connection between the loan market premium and the reserve demand of bank:
xt
dt
= 1 +
1 + iR
1 + ip
241  Et 1+iLt+11+iR
1  covt(
t;t+1; (iLt+1   iR))
35 (27)
The negative of the covariance term in the denominator picks up the risk premium associated
15 Since fWt follows a rectangular distribution, over [0; Dt]Z Dt
MRt
f(fWt)dfWt = Dt  MRt
Dt
= 1  M
R
t
Dt
:
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with the risky loan of banks relative to the risk-free interest rate on reserves. If the bank
loan is not risky, this covariance term is zero in which case a higher loan rate discourages
the holding of bank reserves.16
3.6 Monetary policy
The Central Bank follows a simple money supply rule. It lets the monetary base (MBt ), or
the supply of reserves, MRt (since currency is zero), increase by the following rule:
MBt =M
B
t 1
1 +
 

=
 
MBt 1=M
B
t 2
1 +
 

!
exp(t ) (28)
where  is the policy smoothing coe¢ cient and 

t is the money supply shock, which follows
an AR (1) process. We view a shock to the monetary base as an autonomous liquidity shock.
Money market equilibrium implies that
MRt =M
B
t for all t:
Such a money supply process imposes restriction on the short run growth rate of real reserve
and ination as follows:
(1 + t)(xt=xt 1)
1 + 
=

(1 + t 1)(xt 1=xt 2)
1 + 

exp(t ) (29)
Since real reserves are proportional to deposits as shown in the banks reserve demand
function, (25), this also imposes a restriction on the dynamics of deposits, interest rate on
loans and consumption.
16One may wonder whether there is any borrowing-lending spread because banks are not monopolistic.
Curiously a steady state borrowing-lending spread still emerges in this model because deposit appears in the
utility function and provides a liquidity service (convenience yield) to the household. Bank deposit provides
some transaction utility to the household. Thus the household wishes that the banks do not loan out all
their deposits which would make them illiquid. This convenience yields (alternatively a liquidity premium)
gives rise to credit rationing which gives rise to a positive borrowing-lending spread in the steady state. To
see this, combine (3) and (26) to get the following steady state borrowing-lending spread.
iL   iD = (1 + )

V
0
1 (d; d
p)
U 0(c)
> 0
This convenience yield is akin to forward-spot spread in nance.
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3.7 Interest rate policy
The short term interest rate on government bonds (iGt ) can be broadly interpreted as a policy
rate. We give it an ination targeting Taylor rule as follows:
(1 + iGt )
(1 +
 
iG)
=
0@(1 + iGt 1)
(1 +
 
iG)
1AiG 1 + t 1
1 + 
' Yt
Y
'y(1 iG)
exp(Gt ) (30)
The parameters p > 0 , and y > 0 are the ination, and output gap sensitivity parameters
in the Taylor Rule. Yt denotes GDP, and therefore YtY denotes the output gap. iG is the
interest rate smoothing term and Gt is the policy rate shock.
We shall see later in the quantitative analysis section that the strength of monetary
transmission of a money base shock is signicantly inuenced by the parameters of the Taylor
rule. It should also be noted that while the central bank follows a simple money supply rule,
and short term government bonds follow a Taylor rule, both variables are not simultaneously
endogenous. Base money shocks, by impacting ination, raise interest rates via the Taylor
rule. Money market equilibrium is restored from equation (25) via the stochastic discount
factor (since iR and iP are constant). On the other hand, shocks to the policy rate in (30),
given price stickiness, impacts output through the standard NK channel. Since the monetary
base is exogenous, the change in the policy rate has no e¤ect on the monetary base.
3.8 Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint (in nominal terms) is given by,
PtGt+
 
1 + iGt

Bt 1+(1+iR)MRt 1+(1+i
a)Dat 1 = PtTt+Bt+M
R
t +D
a
t+(1+i
p)Etmax(fWt MRt ; 0)
(31)
where Gt corresponds to real government purchases, and Bt denotes the stock of public debt.
The left hand side of equation (31) denotes total expenditures by the government (nominal
government purchases + interest payments on public debt + interest rates on reserves +
interest payments on administered postal deposits).17 The right hand side of equation (31)
denotes the total resources available to the government (nominal lump sum taxes + new debt
+ new reserves + administered deposits + interest payments from withdrawal penalties).18
17We think of the government as a combined scal-monetary entity.
18Note that on the right hand side of the government budget constraint, we have the expected penalty
income not the actual. The government makes a forecast of the penalty revenue that it will generate at the
end of date t. Once the actual penalty income is realized, there could be a forecast error in governments
prediction of penalty income. Given a mandated government spending, the government has to adjust taxes
to such a prediction error. For example, if the penalty income is under-predicted, the government would end
18
Government spending (or government purchases) evolves stochastically according to:
lnGt   ln
 
G = G

lnGt 1   ln
 
G

+ Gt :
Gt denotes the shock to government spending, and follows an AR(1) process.
4 Rule of thumb (RT ) consumers
An unrealistic feature of our baseline model is that there is no transaction demand for money.
Bank deposits play the role of money in this setting. This could be viewed as an over-
simiplication while modelling the Indian economy, where a vast section of the population
is in the informal sector uses cash as a medium of transaction. In this section, we extend
the model to add a transaction demand for money. We change the risk neutral wholesale
producers hiring workers from two groups of households: (i) who supply labor as a credit
good; (ii) rule of thumb (RT ) workers who supply labor as cash goods. To pay the second
group of workers, the wholesaler needs to carry over some cash. Note that since wholesalers
carry over cash, his problem must be dynamic as opposed to the static problem in Section
3.3. The dynamic cash ow problem facing the risk neutral producers is as follows:
Max
1X
t=0

0
t[Lt+M
T
t 1+(1 k)PtQtKt 1+Pwt Y wt  MTt  WRTt HRTt  W Ft HFt  (1+iLt )Lt 1 QtPtKt]
(32)
where all symbols are the same as before , Lt is new nominal loan and MTt is non-interest
bearing cash (di¤erent from interest bearing bank reserve MRt ; Y
w
t is subject to the produc-
tion function (11). 
0
t is an ination adjusted discount factor which will be specied later.
New notations are HRTt ; H
F
t which are the labor demanded from RT and forward looking
households respectively. Production function is now: Y Wt = 
a
tK

t 1(H
RT
t +H
F
t )
1 : These
two types of labor (which come in the proportion, =(1   )) are assumed to be perfectly
substitutable. Their wages, however, are not the same because of the payment friction for
the RT group.19 The labor market is segmented because a group of workers are unbanked
and want cash for work. Their wage will be subject to an ination tax while for banked
workers, no such ination tax appears.
Wholesale producers are subject to a borrowing constraint as follows:
PtQtKt  Lt (33)
up taxing the household less.
19Thus, the usual labor mobility story does not apply here.
19
We assume that this borrowing constraint binds. Since wholesalers have to pay the rule of
thumb workers in cash, we introduce a cash in advance constraint:
WRTt H
RT
t MTt 1 (34)
The present value Lagrangian is given by:20
L
0P
t = Et
1X
s=0

0
s[Lt+s +M
T
t+s 1 + (1  k)Pt+sQt+sKt+s 1 + Pwt+sY wt+s  MTt+s
 WRTt+sHRTt+s  W Ft+sHFt+s   (1 + iLt+s)Lt+s 1  Qt+sPt+sKt+s]
+
1X
s=0

0
t+s

MTt+s 1  WRTt+sHRTt+s

+
1X
t=0

0
t+s [Lt+s   Pt+sQt+sKt+s] :
where 
0
t; 
0
t are respective lagrange multipliers.
The rst order conditions are given by:
MTt :   
0
t + 
0
t+1 + 
0
t+1 = 0 (35)
HRTt : 
0
t

PWt MPH
RT
t  WRTt
  0tWRTt = 0 (36)
HFt : P
W
t MPH
F
t  W Ft = 0 (37)
K 0t :   
0
tQtPt + 
0
t+1[P
w
t+1MPKt + (1  k)Pt+1Qt+1]  
0
tQtPt = 0 (38)
Lt : 
0
t   
0
t+1(1 + i
L
t+1) + 
0
t = 0 (39)
Since the borrowing constraint binds (
0
t > 0), substitute out 
0
t from (38) and (39) and
verify that the basic return equation (14) holds meaning
1 + iLt+1 =

Pwt+1
Pt+1

MPKt+1
Qt+1
+ 1  k
 
Pt+1Qt+1
PtQt

: (40)
E¤ectively a binding borrowing constraint means that wholesalers virtually rent capital from
banks as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1995).
Next rewrite (36) as:

0
t

0
t
=
(WRTt =Pt)
[(Pwt =Pt)MPH
RT
t   (WRTt =Pt)]
20We ignore expectations temporarily because we want to make sure that a recursive steady state exists.
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Using (35),

0
t

0
t 1   0t
=
 
WRTt =Pt

[(Pwt =Pt)MPH
RT
t   (WRTt =Pt)]
:
Equation (41) which can be rewritten as:
1 

0
t 1=
0
t
  1 =
 
WRTt =Pt

[(Pwt =Pt)MPH
RT
t   (WRTt =Pt)]
(41)
4.1 Specication of the discount factor 
0
t
The wholesalers discount factor 
0
t is given by the sequence of loan rates. In other words,

0
t =
1
(1 + iL0 )
:
1
(1 + iL1 )
:
1
(1 + iL2 )
:::::::
1
(1 + iLt )
which means:

0
t=
0
t 1 =
1
(1 + iLt )
which after plugging into (41) yields,
1
iLt

=
 
WRTt =Pt

[(Pwt =Pt)MPH
RT
t   (WRTt =Pt)]
(42)
The loan rate iLt can be pinned down by (26). Plugging this and rearranging (42) we get:
WRTt
Pt
=
U 0(Ct)
U 0(Ct 1)
:
Pt 1
Pt
:
Pwt
Pt
:MPHt
which is the RT labor demand equation of the dynamic wholesaler. Since the wage bill is
subject to the last period cash constraint, the real wage is subject to an ination tax. Hiring
a worker today also entails use of cash available today which means less cash available for
wage disbursement tomorrow, hence the discounting of marginal product of labor.
In addition, the wholesaler has a usual labor demand function for F households given by:
(PWt =Pt)MPH
F
t   (W Ft =Pt) = 0 (43)
4.2 Labor supplies of RT and Ricardian households
RT; or unbanked consumers, solve the following static maximization problem:
max U(CRTt )  (HRTt )
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s.t.
PtC
RT
t = WtH
RT
t
which gives rise to the following labor supply function of RT consumers:
U 0(C
RT
t )(Wt=Pt) = 
0(HRTt ) (44)
It is easy to verify that with the utility function lnCRTt  HRTt ; the optimal labor supply of
RT consumers is given by:
HRTt = 1 (45)
For F consumers, the labor supply is innitely elastic at W
F
t
Pt
given by (5).
4.3 Labor market equilibrium
There are two segmented labor markets. Due to the payment friction, in the RT sector, two
real wages will prevail in equilibrium. In the technical appendix, we show how this happens
in a steady state equilibrium.
4.4 Government budget constraint
The government now has seigniorage as an additional source of revenue because of the use
of paper money by the rule of thumb household. The government budget constraint changes
to:
PtGt +
 
1 + iGt

Bt 1 + (1 + iR)MRt 1 + (1 + i
a)Dat 1 +M
T
t 1 (46)
= PtTt +Bt +M
R
t +M
T
t +D
a
t + (1 + i
p)Etmax(fWt  MRt ; 0) (47)
4.5 Monetary policy
Money supply is now augmented to include paper currency. In other words, the money
supply (dene it as M st ) is given by
M st =M
T
t +M
R
t
The law of motion of money supply is given by the following stochastic process for M st :
M st =M
s
t 1
1 +
 

=
 
M st 1=M
s
t 2
1 +
 

!
exp(t ) (48)
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5 Quantitative analysis
The objective of our quantitative analysis is to understand why monetary transmission mech-
anism is weak in India using the baseline and extended models. We also want to replicate
the key stylized fact in Section 2 where we show that base money shocks have a stronger
impact on output than policy rate shocks.
We refer to the baseline model as Model 1and its extended version with the presence
of an unbanked population as Model 2. Monetary transmission is dened as the process
through which monetary policy action impacts the aggregate economy (real GDP and ina-
tion). The aggregate demand channel operates in the model economy via two layers: from
policy instruments to bank lending rate, and then, from lending rate to output (including
its components of consumption and investment) and ination. In order to study these chan-
nels of transmission, we focus on the standard instruments of monetary policy used by an
ination targeting central bank. These policy instruments are the money base and the short
term interest rate (which is the government bond rate in our model). The magnitude of
transmission of the shocks from policy instruments to policy targets is measured using the
variance decomposition results of key macroeconomic variables of the model. In our analysis,
we specify the baseline parameterization of the model, calibrate the shock structure to match
empirical moments, report the variance decomposition results and sensitivity experiments
on the di¤erent structural and policy factors in the monetary transmission, and explain the
impulse response properties of the baseline and extended model.
5.1 Calibration
Following the DSGE literature on India and using Indian data on the macroeconomic vari-
ables, we calibrate the structural and policy parameters of our models. The share of capital
in production process is set as 0.3 (Banerjee and Basu, 2017). The discount factor is taken
as 0.98 (Gabriel et al., 2012). Households preference for holding bank deposits is calibrated
based on the share of commercial bank deposits to total deposits which is approximately
84%. Depreciation of physical capital is chosen as 2.5% on a quarterly basis. The invest-
ment adjustment cost parameter is set to 2 from Banerjee and Basu (2017). The mark down
factor, ; for the deposit interest rate is taken as 0.97 in order to match the savings account
deposit rate at the steady state of 3.8%. The price adjustment cost parameter is taken as
118 from Anand et al. (2010) and indexation of past ination is set to 58% following Sahu
(2013). The proportion of rule of thumb consumers in population is set to 35% as estimated
by Gabriel et al. (2012).
We set policy parameters for the Taylor rule stabilizer following Gabriel et al. (2012)
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and Banerjee and Basu (2017), where the interest rate smoothing coe¢ cient is 0.8, ination
stabilizing coe¢ cient is 1.2 and output gap stabilizing coe¢ cient is 0.5. The long run ination
target is set to 4% as proposed by the Urjit Patel Committee Report of RBI (2014). The
steady state value of the policy rate is set to 7% in line with the time average over the period
of last ve-years. In India, the statutory liquidity requirement of the commercial banks is
21.5%, and the value of q is set accordingly. The government administered postal interest
rate is set to 4% as observed from the savings account in the Indian Postal Service. The
steady state value of the penalty rate is set to 6.5%, which is approximately the average of the
marginal standing facility rate in the LAF corridor. The steady state value of productivity
and policy shocks are normalized to one. Table 1 summarizes the baseline values of the
structural and policy parameters.
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Table 1: Structural and Policy Parameters of Baseline Models
Parameters Description Value Source
 Share of capital 0.30 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
 Discount rate 0.98 Gabriel et al., 2011
 Preference for holding bank deposit 0.84 RBI database
k Depreciation rate of capital 0.025 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
 Investment adjustment cost 2 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
 Mark-down factor for Deposit rate 0.97 Set to match the savings account rate
"Y Price elasticity of demand 7 Gabriel et al., 2011
p Price adjustment cost 118 Anand et al., 2010
p Past ination indexation 0.58 Sahu J. P., 2013
iG Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.80 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
' Ination Stabilizing Coe¢ cient 1.20 Gabriel et al., 2011
'y Output Stabilizing Coe¢ cient 0.50 Banerjee & Basu, 2017
q Statutory Liquidity Ratio 21.5% RBI Website
 Long-run ination target 4% Urjit Patel Committee Report, 2013
iG Steady state policy rate 7% RBI Database
ia Steady state administered rate 4% Indian Postal Service Website
ip Steady state penalty rate 6.5% RBI Database
For baseline parameterization of the exogenous shock processes, we broadly follow a
method of moments approach. In Data Appendix E, we have provided the list of relevant
macroeconomic and nancial variables and the method of data transformation used in order
to make the empirical moments comparable with the theoretical moments of interest. We
target nine moments from the data and calibrate nine unknown parameters of shock processes
in order to match the observed moments.21 Having done this, we then examine how some
relevant over-identied moments (which we call non-targeted moments) from the model
compare with the data. Our nine targets are three volatility targets, namely, (i) standard
deviations of output, ination and the lending rate, and (ii) six cross correlation targets,
namely, correlations of output with consumption, investment, bank deposit, correlation of
the lending rate with ination, and correlations of the administered deposit rate with the
policy interest rate and the bank lending rate. For the volatilities, output and CPI ination
21There are nine moments because there are four shock processes with two parameters required to be
calibrated for each. The error term in the interest rate process is however i.i.d., meaning that only one
parameter needs to be calibrated for this equation.
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are considered to be key objectives for ination targeting central banks. Bank lending rate
is the key variable for transmitting monetary impulses. In case of cross-correlations, we
choose targets according to the strengths of statistical signicance. All the correlations are
signicant at 5% level of signicance.
Table 2 summarizes the baseline values of all the second moment parameters of the
shock processes. The calibrated shock parameters are broadly in line with the data and the
relevant literature. For instance, rst order persistence and standard error of TFP (0.82
and 0.016 respectively) and scal policy (0.59 and 0.026 respectively) shocks are close to the
estimates provided by Anand et al. (2010). For the IST shock, the estimates for AR (1)
coe¢ cient and standard error (0.63 and 0.133 respectively) are in line with Banerjee and
Basu (2017). In case of the autonomous shock to money base, our calibrated numbers of
persistence coe¢ cient and standard error (0.48 and 0.021 respectively) ts modestly with
the business cycle component of the growth rate of real reserve. The standard error of the
policy rate shock is set to 0.002, which is slightly on the lower side compared to the estimate
of Anand et al. (2010).
Table 2: Baseline Parameterization of Shock Processes
Param eters Description Values L iterature Source
a Persistence co e¢ cient of TFP shock 0.82 [0.658, 0 .959] Anand et al. 2010

Zx
Persistence co e¢ cient of IST sho ck 0.63 [0.483, 0 .690] Banerjee & Basu , 2017
G Persistence co e¢ cient of F isca l sho ck 0.59 [0.465, 0 .821] Anand et al. 2010
 Persistence co e¢ cient of M oney base sho ck 0.48 0.29 OLS (point) estim ate of AR(1) Coe¢ cient
a Standard error of TFP shock 0.016 [0.001, 0 .009] Anand et al. 2010
Zx Standard error of IST sho ck 0.133 [0.559, 0 .833] Banerjee & Basu , 2017
G Standard error of F isca l sho ck 0.026 [0.052, 0 .083] Anand et al. 2010
 Standard error of M oney base sho ck 0.021 0.066 OLS (point) estim ate of SE
iG Standard error of Interest rate sho ck 0.002 [0.002, 0 .007] Anand et al. 2010
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5.2 Model validation by matching moments
While targeting nine business cycle statistics to minimize the di¤erence between empiri-
cal and theoretical moments, we subsequently check if this exercise can produce a reliable
baseline parameterization of the model. In order to do that, we compare the non-targeted
moments of the business cycle properties of Indian data and our baseline model. Table 3A
and 3B report the data and model comparison for Model 1 and 2 with respect to targeted
and non-targeted moments.22
The output and lending rate volatilities are quite accurately predicted by both models
in terms of the respective standard deviations. The ination volatility is somewhat under-
predicted.
For the non-targeted moments, the model generated rst order persistence coe¢ cients
of output and ination are in line with their data counterparts. The cross correlations in
both models predict the signs correctly. Few important observations are in order. First,
the correlation between output and monetary base growth is positive in both the data and
our models which is indicative of monetary transmission emanating from the changes in
the monetary base. Second, the correlation between the policy rate and the lending rate is
strongly positive in the data and predicted reasonably by the model. One may be tempted to
conclude from this observation that the lending channel of monetary transmission is strong.
However, the correlation between the policy rate and output shows a di¤erent picture. It is
positive in the data and model which goes contrary to the conventional Taylor rule based
wisdom that a lower policy rate would raise output.
22For model validation, we use reserve money as the monetary base for Model 1. For Model 2, we consider
both interest bearing reserves and non-interest bearing cash in the denition of monetary base. This is
because in Model 2 base money includes both paper currency in circulation and reserve money. For this
reason, correlations of [y; (xt=xt 1)] ; [d; (xt=xt 1)] ; and [i; (xt=xt 1)] are marginally di¤erent between Table
3A and 3B.
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Table 3A: Results of Moment Matching between Data and Model 1
Targeted Moments Non-targeted Moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
std. dev (y) 0.02 0.02 correl [y; (xt=xt 1)] 0.39 0.25
std. dev () 0.03 0.01 correl

y; iG

0.34 0.12
std. dev
 
iL

0.02 0.02 correl

iG; iL

0.68 0.37
correl [y; c] 0.38 0.39 correl [da; ] -0.37 -0.84
correl [y; i] 0.79 0.53 correl [d; (xt=xt 1)] 0.38 0.22
correl

iL; 

0.59 0.65 correl [d; i] 0.49 0.33
correl [y; d] 0.69 0.54 correl [i; (xt=xt 1)] 0.33 0.13
correl

da; iG

-0.32 -0.92 AR(1) coe¢ cient of y 0.87 0.79
correl

da; iL

-0.56 -0.47 AR(1) coe¢ cient of  0.84 0.92
Regarding the interpretation of cross correlation results, an important caveat is in order.
This moment matching exercise essentially gives us a broad guidance how the model performs
in matching Indias business cycle statistics. One can not necessarily infer the degree of
monetary transmission or the e¢ cacy of the lending channel of monetary policy by looking
at these cross correlations alone. The reason is that these correlations represent reduced form
relationships and reect co-movement of two series in response to all ve shocks driving the
economy. Hence, even if the correlation between the policy rate and output goes against the
conventional Taylor rule wisdom, it does not necessarily tell us that the interest rate channel
of monetary transmission is weak. For doing a comprehensive analysis, one needs to look
at the variance decomposition of output with respect to the monetary base and policy rate
shocks to which we turn now.
Table 3B: Results of Moment Matching between Data and Model 2
Targeted Moments Non-targeted Moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
std. dev (y) 0.02 0.02 correl [y; (xt=xt 1)] 0.37 0.21
std. dev () 0.03 0.01 correl

y; iG

0.34 0.11
std. dev
 
iL

0.02 0.02 correl

iG; iL

0.68 0.36
correl [y; c] 0.38 0.40 correl [da; ] -0.37 -0.84
correl [y; i] 0.79 0.52 correl [d; (xt=xt 1)] 0.32 0.23
correl

iL; 

0.59 0.64 correl [d; i] 0.49 0.34
correl [y; d] 0.69 0.52 correl [i; (xt=xt 1)] 0.26 0.14
correl

da; iG

-0.32 -0.93 AR(1) coe¢ cient of y 0.87 0.78
correl

da; iL

-0.56 -0.45 AR(1) coe¢ cient of  0.84 0.92
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5.3 Variance decomposition results from baseline model
Table 4 reports the variance decomposition of our ve fundamental shocks for both models.
For Model 1, it is found that monetary policy shocks (adding both autonomous money base
shock and shock to short term policy rate) explains 16.8% of output uctuations in which
the monetary base accounts for 13.08%. The lion share (50.78%) of output uctuations is
explained by the shock to total factor productivity as argued in the literature (Banerjee
and Basu, 2017). In addition, it is noticeable that government spending shocks make a
signicant contribution to cyclical variations (30.05%) in output. Ination (71.76%) and the
bank lending rate (63.48%) are also largely been driven by shocks to total factor productivity.
A similar pattern in the variance decomposition is also observed for Model 2 along with
a new feature. The relative importance of monetary policy shocks decline to 13.92% while
the scal policy shock becomes more important compared to Model 1. The presence of an
unbanked population chokes o¤ the channels of pass-through of monetary transmission to
aggregate demand. Instead, as non-Ricardian household are present, they amplify the scal
spending shocks impact on output uctuations.
Table 4: Variance Decomposition Results for Major Macroeconomic Variables
List of a Zx G  i
G
Variab les Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
y 50.78 50.11 2.36 2.10 30.05 33.87 13.08 10.91 3.72 3.01
c 43.37 48.53 28.09 28.77 9.75 8.59 13.74 10.29 5.05 3.82
i 32.69 31.12 55.41 55.91 3.71 3.88 6.91 7.77 1.29 1.32
 71.76 70.04 0.21 0.19 0.47 0.46 26.91 28.67 0.66 0.64
iL 63.48 62.26 1.19 1.05 5.96 6.01 20.06 21.61 9.31 9.06
iG 31.11 30.06 0.68 0.68 2.87 3.21 59.67 60.00 5.68 6.05 
iL   iD 55.88 55.44 1.26 1.05 8.08 8.25 16.91 17.85 17.87 17.42
d 32.23 32.60 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.15 67.23 66.85 0.16 0.16
da 53.94 51.38 0.85 0.86 4.40 4.79 36.19 38.12 4.62 4.84
TD 49.71 50.65 0.13 0.11 0.47 0.53 49.15 48.13 0.54 0.58
x 33.38 33.81 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.13 66.12 65.69 0.14 0.14
5.4 Sensitivity experiments for monetary transmission
In Table 5, we present the results of sensitivity experiments which are conducted for a variety
of structural and policy parameters of Models 1 and 2. We decrease the baseline values of
these parameters one at a time by 10%. We then check how such a perturbation a¤ects the
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transmission of autonomous shocks to the monetary base and the policy rate compared to
baseline values.
Table 5: Sensitivity Experiments for Monetary Transmission to Output
Sensitiv ity Share of  in FEVD in y Share of i
G
in FEVD in y correl [y; (xt=xt 1)] correl

y; iG

Experim ents Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Baseline 13.08 10.91 3.72 3.01 0.247 0.213 0.116 0.105
 = 0:756 13.08 10.95 3.72 3.01 0.247 0.214 0.116 0.106
ia= 0:036 13.08 10.91 3.72 3.01 0.247 0.213 0.116 0.105
q= 0:194 13.08 10.91 3.72 3.01 0.247 0.213 0.116 0.105
 = 0:873 44.25 42.00 0.84 0.65 0.499 0.441 0.554 0.561
p= 106 11.57 9.52 3.44 2.75 0.241 0.207 0.081 0.072
p= 0:522 14.53 12.16 3.94 3.20 0.248 0.214 0.153 0.143
'= 1:08 15.93 13.62 3.90 3.18 0.273 0.238 0.176 0.167
'y= 0:45 13.37 11.17 3.72 3.03 0.252 0.218 0.108 0.097
iG= 0:72 12.12 9.67 1.83 1.41 0.213 0.183 0.142 0.129
A few observations are in order. First, a change in the preference parameter () for
commercial bank deposit holding (d), causes no change in the baseline values of the monetary
transmission indicators. Second, changes in the nancial repression parameter, q (the SLR
requirement) and ia (the administered interest rate) have a negligible impact on monetary
transmission. Third, not surprisingly, with low price adjustment costs (p) and a higher
degree of past ination indexation (p) in the retail sector, monetary transmission becomes
weaker. Lower values of the nominal friction and the lack of forward looking price setting
behavior limits the real e¤ects of a monetary policy shock via the expectation channel.
Fourth, the mark-down factor () for the deposit interest rate has a major implication
for monetary transmission driven by the money base. The transmission of monetary base
shock becomes conspicuously higher as seen by the error variance decomposition and money-
output correlation while the transmission of interest rate shock is remarkably diminished.
The intuition for this stems from the fact that a lower  marks down the interest rate
on deposits which discourages the household to accumulate bank deposits. Since reserve
demand is proportional to bank deposits (see equation 27), banks hold fewer reserves and
extend more loans. Thus the propagation of a shock to monetary base becomes stronger
through the bank lending channel because banks hold less reserves. On the other hand,
since a lower  widens the spread between borrowing and lending rates (iLt   iDt ), the pass
through from a policy rate shock to the bank lending rate (iLt ), and i
L
t is largely determined
by ination, transmission becomes weaker which explains why the policy rate accounts for
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less variation in output. Fifth, the smoothing coe¢ cient of the policy rate Taylor rule
has a noteworthy implication for monetary transmission. A lower iG signicantly reduces
monetary transmission of the policy rate as evidenced by the variance decomposition of
output. The policy rate accounts for 1.83% as opposed to 3.72% of output variation when
the smoothing coe¢ cient drops. The lower response of output is due to the lower degree of
persistent variation in the interest rate in response to a policy shock which translates into less
persistent output uctuations. Finally, not surprisingly, less aggressive ination targeting
(lower ') and less output stabilization (lower 'y) raises the pass through of monetary base
shock to output, ination and the nominal loan rate.
5.5 Impulse response analysis of the monetary transmission mech-
anism
Following the reliability check of the baseline model with data, we study the propagation
mechanism of the shocks to monetary policy instrument given that the Taylor-type stabilizer
is in place. As mentioned earlier, there are two types of policy shocks in action. First, the
shocks to base money growth which are akin to autonomous liquidity shocks and may be
beyond the control of the central bank. Second, the shocks to the short-term policy interest
rate by the central bank are a conscious e¤ort to impact the real and/or nancial target
variables according to a policy mandate. What is the propagation mechanism of such shocks
to base money and policy interest rate in the model? We investigate that using the properties
of impulse response plots given in Figure 3 to 6.23
23The IRF plots of monetary policy shocks in Model 2 are similar to Model 1 except for minor quantitative
di¤erences.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of Shock to Money Base
A positive shock to monetary base immediately translates into positive ination via the
monetary base rule of equation (27) which translates into a higher real marginal cost (Pw=
P ) via the staggered price adjustment cost equation (17). Higher real marginal cost makes
rms expand output along the standard new Keynesian channel. Higher real marginal costs
also translate into a higher implicit rental price of capital which promotes investment. Thus,
a Tobin type e¤ect works for stimulating investment in response to an inationary monetary
shock. Real consumption rises because of higher output and real wage (a wealth e¤ect).
Output expansion of the wholesale rms increases the demand for labor, leads to a higher
real wage, and encourages workers to supply more labor in the production process. Higher
ination raises the policy rate (iG) via the Taylor rule which acts as a built in stabilizer for
our policy experiment. A positive shock to the monetary base has thus an unambiguously
stimulative e¤ect on the economy.
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Figure 4: E¤ects of Shock to Money Base
In the banking sector, the interest rate on deposits rise (iD) because it is set in proportion
to the government bond rate iG, which positively responds to ination via the interest rate
feedback rule. A higher deposit rate encourages depositors to hold more bank deposits which
means real deposits in commercial banks (d) rise. Since, demand for real reserves by banks
(x) is proportional to its deposits (d), as given in the banks reserve demand equation (24), a
higher money base raises real reserves although the ratio of money to deposit (x=d) falls. This
facilitates more bank lending, more investment and greater accumulation of the capital stock
which contributes further to a rise in the real wage. The nominal loan rate rises momentarily
due to a higher ination rate which is well known as Fisher e¤ect. The higher interest rate
on deposits due to the interest rate stabilizer makes bank deposits by households increase
while deposits in administered postal deposits, i.e. da, fall. This happens because depositors
substitute away from postal to bank deposits, although total deposits rise. Although the
deposit rate rises due to the interest rate stabilizer, the borrowing-lending spread still widens,
which means that the loan rate rises more than the deposit rate.
In a similar vein, we next examine the e¤ects of a negative shock to the short-term policy
interest rate. A negative shock to the policy interest rate generates an expansionary impact
on output in the economy through the standard new Keynesian channel via the interest rate
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policy rule (30). Because ination and real marginal costs go up, a similar Tobin e¤ect is
at work which raises investment. Households reduce the holding of bank deposits due to a
low deposit rate. They consume more and also switch to administered deposits. Shortage of
loanable funds raises the interest rate on loan.
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Figure 5: E¤ects of Shock to Policy Interest Rate
Due to inationary pressure, the nominal interest rate on bank lending goes up sharply
on impact. However, this rise of the bank lending rate does not last for long, and comes
down in subsequent periods, and follows the movement of the policy interest rate. Following
the decline of the policy interest rate, the marked down interest rate for bank deposits also
falls which motivates the households to reshu­ e their deposit holding from the commercial
banks to postal service for a relatively higher return from the administered rate. So, bank
deposits decline and administered deposits increase. As a consequence of declining bank
deposits, real reserves fall.
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Figure 6: E¤ects of Shock to Policy Interest Rate
The comparison of output impulse responses of monetary base versus policy rate shocks
reveals that the output response is much more prolonged for a positive shock to monetary
base as opposed to the interest rate. The impact e¤ect of output with respect to a monetary
base shock is signicantly bigger than the output response with respect to a negative policy
rate shock. In addition, the positive e¤ect lasts more than 20 quarters for a monetary base
shock (Figure 3), while for the interest rate shock, it dissipates after 10 quarters (Figure
5). The punch-line of this exercise is that a shock to monetary base has a far stronger and
persistent e¤ect on output than the shock to policy interest rate. This agrees well with the
empirical VAR impulse responses reported in Section 2.
5.6 Impulse response analysis from the extended model
The impulse responses of Model 2 are similar to Model 1 (see Appendix D, Figures 11-14, for
the IRF plots) except for output and consumption. Figure 7 compares the output responses
of a positive money shock in both models. Regarding the impact e¤ect, an expansionary
monetary policy raises output in both models but much less in Model 2. From the second
period, output rises discretely in Model 2 and then declines. The capital stock is predeter-
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mined in the rst period of the shock while aggregate employment rises less than model 1
because the employment of RT consumers is xed at unity by construction. This feeble rise
in employment translates into a weak impact on output in the rst period of the monetary
shock in Model 2 compared to Model 1. In the second period, the Tobin e¤ect of a higher
ination picks up which boosts output via the capital stock. From date 3 onward output
starts reverting to the mean. The response of output to a negative interest rate shock is
similar to a money base shock and thus are not reported for brevity.
Figures 9 and 10 report the response of consumption of F and RT consumers to a pos-
itive money base shock and a negative policy rate shock in Model 2. The RT consumers
su¤er a sharp drop in consumption in response to either form of monetary stimulus while
the forward looking consumers experience a rise in consumption. Two countervailing e¤ects
are at work here. First is the ination tax and the second is the output e¤ect. The ination
tax lowers the real wage of RT consumers which lowers their consumption immediately. The
subsequent rise in consumption happens due to a sharp rise in output which happens via
the Tobin e¤ect mentioned earlier. This positive output e¤ect explains why RT consumers
experience a higher consumption in the second period. Monetary policy has stark distri-
butional consequences because an inationary monetary policy hurts RT consumers most.
This negative consumption e¤ect also hinders monetary transmission from the demand side
as seen by the weak impact e¤ect of an easy monetary policy.
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Figure 7: Output response to a positive money shock in both models
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Figure 9: Responses of RT and F household consumption to a monetary shock in Model 2
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Figure 10: Responses of RT and F consumption to policy rate shock in Model 2
6 Conclusion
The key research question of this paper is: what explains weak monetary policy transmission
mechanism in India? We construct a monetary business cycle model with sticky prices cal-
ibrated to the Indian economy to address this question. We focus on the aggregate demand
channel for monetary transmission. The baseline model shows that the major part of output
uctuations are explained by real shocks to the economy (TFP shocks) rather than nominal
shocks (base money and interest rate shocks from the Taylor rule). Fiscal policy shocks have
a fairly large role to play in explaining output variation, but a lesser role in other macro-
economic aggregates. IST shocks have a negligible role in explaining output uctuations in
the economy. In an extended version of the model with a transaction demand for money, we
show that the importance of scal shocks increases relative to the baseline model. An ina-
tionary monetary policy reduces real wages of the rule of thumb consumers, which reduces
their consumption. This adversely e¤ects monetary policy transmission. Overall, our model
is able to quantify the extent to which particular shocks matter in the transmission process.
In a comparison of output impulse responses of monetary base versus policy rate shocks,
we show that the output response is much more prolonged for a positive shock to the mon-
etary base as opposed to the interest rate. The impact e¤ect of output with respect to
a monetary base shock is signicantly bigger than the output response with respect to a
negative policy rate shock. In addition, the positive e¤ect lasts more than 20 quarters for a
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monetary base shock, while for the interest rate shock it dissipates after 10 quarters. The
punch-line of this exercise is that a shock to monetary base has a far stronger and persistent
e¤ect on output than the shock to policy interest rate. This agrees well with the empirical
VAR impulse responses reported in Section 2.
Finally, our paper also addresses a long standing hypotheses in the policy discussion on
the impediments to monetary transmission. A prominent hypothesis is that the existence
of an administered banking sector could undermine the role of monetary policy. A second
hypothesis is that nancial repression, in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio, raises the
cost of funds facing banks, which weakens the e¢ cacy of monetary policy. The calibrated
baseline model does not lend support to either of these two hypotheses. The impulse response
and variance decompositions of monetary policy shock are robustly invariant to changes in
the administered postal rate, allocation of deposits between these two savings institutions,
and to changes in the statutory liquidity ratio.
The lesson is that we need to understand the instruments of monetary control better,
as well as the nature of real-monetary interactions, before we make any serious predictions
about monetary transmission.
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A Technical appendix
 The Lagrangian for the household problem is given by,
Lt = Et
1X
s=0
s[U(Ct+s)  (Ht+s) + V (Dt+s=Pt+s; Dat+s=Pt+s)  (A.1)
t(Pt+sCt+s + Pt+sTt+s +Dt+s +D
a
t+s  Wt+sHt+s  
1 + iDt+s

Dt+s 1   (1 + ia)Dat+s 1   kt+s   rt+s   bt+s)]
The households optimal choices are given by
@Lt
@Ct
= U 0(Ct)  tPt = 0
@Lt
@Ht
= 0(Ht)  tWt = 0
@Lt
@Dt
=
V1(Dt=Pt; D
a
t =Pt)
Pt
  t + Et

t+1
 
1 + iDt+1
	
= 0
@Lt
@Dat
=
V2(Dt=Pt; D
a
t =Pt)
Pt
  t + Et ft+1 (1 + ia)g = 0:
 To obtain equation (9), set 
t;t = 1 in (8), and solve for Qt,
0 = PtQt   Pt

1 + S

It
It 1

  PtS 0

It
It 1

It
It 1
+ 
t;t+1Pt+1S
0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
PtQt = Pt

1 + S

It
It 1

+ PtS
0

It
It 1

It
It 1
  
t;t+1Pt+1S 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
Qt =

1 + S

It
It 1

+ S 0

It
It 1

It
It 1
  
t;t+1Pt+1
Pt
S 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
Note that 
t;t+1 = Et [U 0 (Ct+1) =U 0 (Ct)] [Pt=Pt+1]. Substituting this, we get equation
(9)
 To derive equation (24), the Lagrangian is given by
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Et
1X
s=0

t;t+s
8>>>><>>>>:
264 (1 + i
L
t )Lt+s 1 + (1 + i
R)MRt+s 1   (   q)(1 + iGt+s)Dt+s 1
 (1 + ip)t+s(W^t+s 1  MRt+s 1)  (1  t+s)W^t+s 1
+(1  q)Dt+s   Lt+s  MRt+s
375
+t+s

MRt+s   rDt+s

9>>>>=>>>>;
The rst order condition with respect to MRt is given by
24
( 1)
t;t + 
t;tt + Et
t;t+1(1 + iR) + Et
t;t+1(1 + ip)
Z Dt
MRt
f(fWt)dfWt = 0: (A.2)
Setting 
t;t = 1; the Euler equation for MRt is given by equation (22)
24Note that
d
dMRt
hRDt
MRt
hfWt  MRt i f(fWt)dWt   RMRt0 fWtf(fWt)dWti
=   RDt
MRt
f(fWt)dfWt
43
B Technical appendix
The short run system has 19 endogenous variables:

t;t+1 i
L
t Kt Ht Yt Ct It dt d
p
t xt i
D
t i
G
t Tt t Qt Wt=Pt Gt Pt=P
w
t At :
There are four interest rate parameters, iR; ia; iG; iD;and note that ia = iG = iD =
 
is:
The 18 equations are given by.
1: 
t;t+1 =
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
:(1 + t+1)
 1 (B.3)
2. U 0(Ct) = V
0
1 (dt; d
a
t ) + Et

U 0(Ct+1)
 
1 + iDt+1

(1 + t+1)
 1	 (B.4)
3:U 0(Ct) = V
0
2 (dt; d
a
t ) + Et

U 0(Ct+1) (1 + ia) (1 + t+1) 1
	
(B.5)
4. 0(Ht) = (Wt=Pt)U 0(Ct): (B.6)
5:Qt = 1 + S

It
It 1

+ S 0

It
It 1

It
It 1
  EtU
0 (Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)
"
S 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2#
: (B.7)
6: (1 + iLt ) =
(PWt =Pt)MPKt + (1  k) (1 + t)Qt
Qt 1
(B.8)
7:
Wt
Pt
= (1  ) P
W
t Yt
PtHt
(B.9)
8:
Pt
PWt
=
"Y
"Y   1
24 1 + p"Y  1  1+t1+ n (1+t)(1+)   1o
 
t;t+1 p"Y  1
n
yt+1
yt
(1+t+1)
2
(1+)
h
(1+t+1)
(1+)
  1
io 35 1 (B.10)
9: Yt = AK

t 1H
1 
t (B.11)
10: Ct + It +Gt +
p
2
"
1 + t
(1 + )
  1
2
yt
#
+ S

It
It 1

It
price adj cos t| {z }
= AtK

t 1H
1 
t (B.12)
11:Gt+
 
1 + iGt
 bt 1
1 + t
+(1+iRt )
xt 1
1 + t
+(1+ia)
dat 1
1 + t
= Tt+bt+xt+d
a
t+(1+i
p
t )dtEmax(
fWt
Dt
 M
R
t
Dt
; 0)
(B.13)
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12:
xt
dt
= 1  1  (1 + i
R)Et
t;t+1
(1 + ip)Et
t;t+1
(B.14)
13: Lt : 1 = Et
t;t+1(1 + i
L
t+1) (B.15)
14. Gt  
 
G = G

Gt 1  
 
G

+ Gt (B.16)
15: At  
 
A = A

At 1  
 
A

+ At (B.17)
16: Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It (B.18)
17
(1 + t)(xt=xt 1)
1 + 
=

(1 + t 1)(xt 1=xt 2)
1 + 

(B.19)
18: 1 + iDt = (1 + i
G
t ) (B.20)
19:
(1 + iGt )
(1 + iG)
=
 
(1 + iGt 1)
(1 + iG)
!
iG 
1 + t 1
1 + 
' Yt
Y
'y(1 iG)
(B.21)
B.1 Steady State
In this section, we solve for the steady state values of the endogenous variables. Equation
(14) in the steady state is given by,
1 + iL =

PW
P

MPK
Q
+ 1  K

(1 + ) (B.22)
as Pt+1
Pt
= 1 + t+1. Further, from equation (9) and (18) in the steady state, Q = 1 and
PW = "
Y  1
"Y
P , respectively. Also, in the steady state, Y W = KH1  which implies that
MPK = Y
W
K
. The above equation thus reduces to,
1 + iL =

"Y   1
"Y

Y W
K

+ 1  K

(1 + ) (B.23)
Recalling that in the steady state, the stochastic discount factor is given by 
1+
; substituting
this into the steady version of equation (26) yields, 1+ iL = (1+)

. From this expression, we
can solve for the steady state capital-labor ratio, K=H, which is given by
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KH
=
(


"Y   1
"Y
"
1
1

  (1  K)
#) 1
1 
(B.24)
which we call  hereafter.
The national income identity is given by,
C + KK +G = K
H1  (B.25)
Assume the following functional forms:  (Ht) = Ht, U (Ct) = ln (Ct) and V (dt; dat ) =
 ln dt + (1  ) ln dat . Thus in steady state, 0 (H) = 1, U 0 (C) = 1=C; V 01 (:; :) = d and
V 02 (:; :) =
(1 )
da
: Substituting for these values into equation (5); in the steady state we get
C = W=P: (B.26)
Next note from (12) and (18), W=P = (1  )

"Y  1
"Y
  
K
H

: Therefore,
C = (1  )

"Y   1
"Y

() : (B.27)
Now, substituting V 01 (:; :) =

d
in equation (3), we get,
1
C
= V
0
1 (:; :) + 
1
C
 
1 + iD

(1 + )
(B.28)
The above can be re-written as,
1 + iD=
1 +    C
d
(1 + )

(B.29)
Similarly substituting V 02 (:; :) =
(1 )
da
: in equation (4) ;we get,
1 + ia =
1 +    (1  ) C
da
(1 + )

(B.30)
Since K
H
= ; equation (B:25) above thus reduces to,
C +G =

 (1 )   K

K (B.31)
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Recall, from equation (31) the government budget constraint is given by,
PtGt+
 
1 + iG

Bt 1+(1+iR)MRt 1+(1+i
a)Dat 1 = PtTt+Bt+M
R
t +D
a
t+(1+i
p)Emax(fWt MRt ; 0)
(B.32)
Dividing throughout by Pt and noting that PtPt 1 = 1 + t; we get
Gt+
 
1 + iGt
 bt 1
1 + t
+(1+iRt )
xt 1
1 + t
+(1+ia)
dat 1
1 + t
= Tt+bt+xt+d
a
t+(1+i
p
t )dtEmax(
fWt
Dt
 M
R
t
Dt
; 0)
(B.33)
where xt =MRt =Pt, dt =
Dt
Pt
; and bt = Bt=Pt:
In the steady state, the above equation becomes
G+
 
1 + iGt
 b
1 + 
+(1+iRt )
x
1 + 
+(1+ia)
da
1 + 
= T+b+x+da+(1+ipt )dEmax(
fWt
Dt
 M
R
t
Dt
; 0);
(B.34)
or,
G(1+)+
 
iG    b+(iR )x+(ia )da = T (1+)+(1+ip)dEmax(fWt
Dt
 M
R
t
Dt
; 0)(1+)
(B.35)
Dividing through the above expression by d; yields,
G(1 + )
d
+
 
iG   q + (iR  )x
d
+ (ia  )d
a
d
=
T
d
+ (1+ ip)Emax(
fWt
Dt
  M
R
t
Dt
; 0)(1 + )
(B.36)
since B=D = q (which implies b=d = q) Also,xd =
MR=P
D=P
:
We can substitute out for d
a
d
in the above equation (B.36) from equation (B:29) and
(B:30) nothing that.
d

1 +      1 + iD = C(1 + ) (B.37)
da [1 +     (1 + ia)] = (1  )C(1 + ) (B.38)
or,
d
da
=

1  

1 +     (1 + ia)
1 +     (1 + iD)

; (B.39)
and
x
d
= 1  1  (1 + i
R) 
1+
(1 + ip) 
1+
: (B.40)
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Finally, let us solve for Emax(fWt
Dt
  MRt
Dt
; 0) in the steady state: Assume fWt
Dt
= Zt; and since
Dt is given, Zt follows an uniform distribution as fWt but between [0; 1]: Thus,
Etmax(Zt   M
R
t
Dt
; 0) =
Z 1
MRt =Dt

Zt   M
R
t
Dt

h (Zt) dZt
Since h (Zt) = 1;
Etmax(Zt   M
R
t
Dt
; 0) =
Z 1
MRt =Dt

Zt   M
R
t
Dt

dZt
=
Z2t
2
1
MRt =Dt
  M
R
t
Dt
Ztj1MRt =Dt
=
0B@1 

MRt
Dt
2
2
1CA  MRt
Dt

1  M
R
t
Dt

=
1
2
+
1
2

MRt
Dt
2
  M
R
t
Dt
= 0:5

1  M
R
D
2
(B.41)
where M
R
D
is given by (24) evaluated at the steady state.
Continuing from the above government budget constraint (B:36) we get
G(1 + )
d
+
 
iG   q+(iR )x
d
+(ia )d
a
d
=
T
d
+(1+ip)0:5
 
1 
(
1  1  (1 + i
R) 
1+
(1 + ip) 
1+
)!2
(B.42)
From the above equation, we can solve for steady state lump-sum taxes, T: In Technical
Appendix B, we summarize the steady state equations in recursive form.
We have 19 steady state equations, which can be written as a recursive system. These
are
1. (1 + iL) = (1 + )=
2. (1 + iL) =
h
"Y  1
"Y


 
K
H
 1
+ 1  K
i
(1 + )
3. W=P = (1  )

"Y  1
"Y

() where  = K=H solved from the preceding equation
4. C = W=P
5. G =
 
G
6. Using C +G =

 (1 )   K

K; and steady state G, Solve K
7. Using K=H = ; solve H
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8. Using d

1 +      1 + iD = C(1 + ), and (5) above solve for d:
9. da [1 +     (1 + ia)] = (1  )C(1 + ); solve for da
10. x
d
= 1  1 (1+iR) 

(1+ip)

11. Pt
PWt
= "
Y
"Y  1 :
12. I = K
13.  = long run ination target (
 
) (Note that this is pinned down by the money supply
rule (29))
14. T solved from the steady state government budget constraint
15. (Stochastic Discount Factor) 
 = =(1 + )
16. Y = AKH1 
17. A =
 
A
18. iG = iG
19. 1 + iD = (1 + iG)
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C Technical appendix
C.1 Recursive steady state
Assume the same log utility for consumption.
It is straightforward to verify that the steady state real wage is:
WRT
P
=

1 + 
:
"Y   1
"Y
MPHRT (C.43)
In other words, now
WRT=P =

1 + 
(1  )

"Y   1
"Y
 
K=(:1 + (1  )HF 
G(1 + )
d
+
 
iG   q+(iR )x
d
+(ia )d
a
d
= T+

1 + 
mT+(1+ip)Emax(
fWt
Dt
 M
R
t
Dt
; 0)
(C.44)
where we have the new term 
1+
mT which is the ination tax revenue from wholesalers
holding of real balance (where mT =MT=P ).
The CIA (34) gives the steady state money demand function:
(WRT=P )HRT =
mT
1 + 
=> mT = (WRT=P )(1 + )HRT
Given that HRT = 1,
mT = (WRT=P )(1 + )
The national income identity (equation 6 in Appendix B) changes to:
CF + CRT +G =

 (1 )   K

K (C.45)
=> (1  )W F=P + WRT=P +G =  (1 )   KK
From here we can solve K and then using  = K=H solve H: To sum up: the steady
state system thus changes to 22 equations (three extra variables mT ; W
RT
P
; and CRT ).
1. (1 + iL) = (1 + )=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2. (1 + iL) =

"Y  1
"Y



K
HRT+(1 )HF
 1
+ 1  K

(1 + )
3. WRT=P = 
1+
(1  )

"Y  1
"Y

() where  = K=( + (1   )HF ) solved from the
preceding equation
4. W F=P = (1  )

"Y  1
"Y

()
(Note there are two steady state real wages. Higher ination depresses the RT real wage
and creates more wage inequality)
5. CF = W F=P from (5) given the assumption that utility function: lnC  H
6. CRT = (WRT=P ) because RT consumers FOC dictates HRT = 1
7. mT= (WRT=P )(1 + ) (from CIA )
8. G =
 
G
9. Using CRT + (1   )CF + G =
 
A (1 )   K

K; and steady state G, Solve K
(Modied)
10. Using  = K=(+ (1  )HF ) solve HF
11. Using d

1 +      1 + iD = CF (1 + ), and (5) above solve for d:
12. dp [1 +     (1 + ia)] = (1  )CF (1 + ); solve for da
13. x
d
= 1  1 (1+iR) 

(1+ip)

14. Pt
PWt
= "
Y
"Y  1 :
15. I = K
16.  = long run ination target (
 
) (Note that this is pinned down by the money supply
rule (29))
17. T solved from the steady state government budget constraint (C.44) (Modied)
18. (Stochastic Discount Factor) 
 = =(1 + )
19. Y = AKH1 
20. A =
 
A
21. iG = iG
22. 1 + iD = (1 + iG)
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D Technical appendix: IRF plots of Model 2
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Figure 11: E¤ects of a Shock to the Money Base
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Figure 12: E¤ects of a Shock to the Money Base
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Figure 13: E¤ects of a Shock to the Policy Interest Rate
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Figure 14: E¤ects of a Shock to the Policy Interest Rate
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E Technical appendix: Data
We use quarterly data of the macroeconomic and nancial variables over the sample period of
1996: Q4 to 2016: Q4 both for the atheoretical VAR analysis as well as the model validation
exercise (presented in Section 2 and Section 5, respectively). The list of variables include: real
GDP, real consumption, real investment, real commercial bank deposits, real postal deposits,
the 91 days treasury bill rate, CPI ination, the bank lending rate, and the growth rate of
the monetary base. GDP, consumption, investment, and government spending are measured
in constant prices with base year 2011-2012. Except for the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
all data are taken from the data base of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The Consumer
Price Index for all commodities with base year 2010 is obtained from the St. Louis FRED
database.
For the purpose of the VAR analysis and moment matching exercise, we make stationary
the data series of the variables which are in levels and leave the rate variables (like interest
rates and CPI year on year ination) unchanged. Using the business cycle ltering method
proposed by Baxter and King (1999), we de-trend the log-transformed data series of real
GDP, real consumption, real investment, real commercial bank deposits, and real postal
deposits. The growth rate of the monetary base is computed using two denitions of money
base: one is reserve money (comparable for Model 1) and the other is sum of currency
and reserve money (comparable for Model 2). The prime lending rate of the State Bank of
India (SBI) is used as a proxy measure for the bank lending rate since the SBI group plays
a dominant role in the Indian banking system and their lending rate is followed by other
competing banks.
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